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ABSTRACT
Background: The launch of hepatitis C (HCV) drugs such as sofosbuvir or ledipasvir has fostered
the question of affordability of novel high budget impact therapies even in countries with high
domestic product. European countries have developed a variety of mechanisms to improve
affordability of such therapies, including ‘affordability thresholds’, price volume agreements or
caps on individual product sales, and special budgets for innovative drugs. While some of these
mechanisms may help limit budget impact, there are still significant progresses to be made in the
definition and implementation of approaches to ensure affordability, especially in health systems
where the growth potential in drug spending and/or in the patient contribution to health
insurance are limited. Objectives: In this article, we will review how seven countries in western
Europe are approaching the question of affordability of novel therapies and are developing
approaches to continue to reward new sciences while limiting budget impact. We will also
discuss the question of affordability of cost-effective but hugely expensive therapies and the
implications for payers and for the pharmaceutical industry. Results: There is clearly not one
solution that is used consistently across countries but rather a number of ‘tools’ that are
combined differently in each country. This illustrates the difficulty of managing affordability
within different legal frameworks and within different health care system architectures.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 2 March 2018









Target 8E of the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals acknowledges the need to improve
the availability of affordable medicines in developing
countries [1] and significant, albeit insufficient pro-
gresses have been made in that regard. However, fol-
lowing the launch of highly expensive drugs targeting
very large populations such as hepatitis C drugs or
PCSK9 inhibitors (proprotein convertase subtilsin-kexin
type 9 – latest class of cholesterol-lowering drugs), the
question of affordability of new medicines has also now
emerged in developed countries.
In the USA, the high price of prescription drugs was
a topic for policy proposals from presidential candi-
dates [2], and the need to balance affordability with
incentives for innovation was recently discussed in the
New England Journal of Medicine [3]. In Europe, most
countries define yearly, and sometime mid-term,
growth targets in drug spending. Those could range
from virtually no growth such as in England to a few
percent per year as in Germany. Meeting these targets
is increasingly challenging and drug reimbursement has
to be balanced with the mandate to provide high qual-
ity care to all without discrimination on the basis of age,
income or other socio-economic considerations.
Furthermore, increase in drug spending competes
with funding of physicians, hospitals, nurses and other
health or social expenses.
Gilead’s hepatitis C Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) illustrates the
challenges in achieving that balance. Despite a cure
rate greater than 95% and despite the therapy being
accepted as cost-effective [4], several European health
systems were forced to limit budget impact through
prescription delays, limits on target patients or caps on
revenues. The World Health Organization recently pre-
sented a detailed analysis of budget impact of treating
patients with hepatitis C with sofosbuvir or ledipasvir/
sofosbuvir [5]. Treating just 20% of hepatitis C patients
would consume about 20% of annual drug expenditure
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in Italy and Spain, 6% in England, and 4% in Germany
and France.
Affordability of novel innovative and high budget
impact therapies has become an important topic in
Europe and so far, each country has come up with
individual approaches to improve affordability. While
some may be efficacious, at least partially, there is no
consistent mechanism and this is creating an increas-
ingly complex environment for companies introducing
innovative medicines. The objective of this review is to
describe how seven countries in western Europe are
approaching the question of affordability of novel
therapies, and are developing approaches to continue
to reward new sciences while limiting budget impact.
We will also discuss the question of affordability of cost-
effective but hugely expensive therapies and the impli-
cations for payers and for the pharmaceutical industry.
Material and methods
The information described in this paper comes from the
personal experience of the authors who are payers, ex-
payers or researchers in the field of Market Access in
their respective countries. This knowledge was comple-
mented by targeted secondary research on the ques-
tion of affordability of novel therapies. For the analysis
we chose to cover the five main western Europe coun-
tries. We also included Sweden and The Netherlands as
the subject of ‘affordability’ is being extensively dis-
cussed in the payer communities in these two
countries.
Germany
In Germany, the legal framework has established a formal
review process (Arzneimittelmarkt- Neuordnungsgesetz –
AMNOG) to determine the extent of patient relevant addi-
tional benefit for novel therapies [6] followed by a formal
national negotiation process. In that process, G-BA
(Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss or Federal Joint
Committee) does not evaluate the appropriateness of
the price, does not look at cost-effectiveness and does
not consider the overall budget impact. In the subsequent
price negotiation between manufacturer and GKV-
Spitzenverband (Head organization of the Statutory
Health Insurance Funds), the budget impact is taken into
account, but as there is no fixed drug budget, affordability
is not a formal factor in the price negotiation.
Affordability is more relevant in the hospital setting.
Drugs for inpatient use have to be purchased by the
hospitals out of their diagnosis related (DRG) reimbur-
sement. If they do not receive additional funding over
DRG reimbursement, high cost drugs can be a
challenge.
There is no ongoing discussion about a general
threshold to guarantee affordability of drugs. Only the
sales volume in the initial 12-month period of free
pricing with full reimbursement was discussed to be
limited. But this suggestion did not make it into the
AMVSG (Arzneimittelversorgungsstärkungsgesetz) law
in 2017 and is currently not on the political agenda [7].
Affordability in Germany thus must be reflected
within the yearly prescription spend negotiations
between the Association of Physicians and the
Association of Sick Funds. Specific bodies are advising
physicians on the use of novel expensive drugs in order
to remain within prescription limits. Recommendations
are usually not developed before the G-BA issues its
verdict. After the price negotiation, physicians are
sometimes informed which patients really benefit and
need an immediate treatment. Sick funds also try to
enter into additional agreements with manufacturers
about discounts. But their negotiation power is limited
as they cannot prevent physicians from prescribing an
expensive drug with an additional benefit.
There is an ongoing discussion at political level as to
whether the current pricing policies of Pharma compa-
nies are sustainable for Germany, especially as compa-
nies may introduce drugs with additional benefits at
very high prices. The experience until now shows that
politicians in Germany are not willing to deny funding
for drugs with an additional benefit. Even the practical
rejection of some new drugs with no additional benefit
by limiting them to the price of a cheap generic
Standard of Care is under discussion. Politicians cur-
rently prefer to achieve savings by freezing prices [7]
or asking for mandatory discounts for all branded pro-
ducts rather than by rejecting coverage of specific pro-
ducts based on an affordability criteria.
France
In France, until very recently the budget impact of
novel therapies was not a formal factor in the evalua-
tion, coverage decision or pricing process. The focus
was on avoiding off-label use through a clear definition
of the target patient population by Haute Authorité de
Santé (HAS), followed by price volume agreements
reducing the incentive for the industry to increase
sales over a certain threshold.
However, the need to manage budget impact is
increasingly becoming a concern and has led to several
discussions between payers and the pharmaceutical
industry. Since 2016, products subject to economic
evaluation by HAS (Incremental Therapeutic Progress –
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ASMR III requested, >€20million in sales expected) must
also submit a budget impact estimate if sales during
the second year of commercialization are above €50mil-
lion [8]. Between €20million and €50million, the budget
impact estimate is not mandatory but recommended.
The estimate should not simply define the target popu-
lation but also the size of the likely treated population.
At present the professed objective is not to limit
access to drugs over a certain budget impact threshold,
but rather to anticipate budget needs and the growth
of pharmaceutical expenditures. However, it is clear
that the pricing committee (CEPS) will take into account
the expected budget impact, even though it will remain
informal and no budget impact threshold will be
defined. While nominal prices are often high, real prices
can be much lower with discounts and price volume
agreements renegotiated on a regular basis.
To provide funding for innovative drugs France is
trying to generate economies in other areas of health
spending [9]. Over the last years a number of products
with minimal clinical value have been de-reimbursed
[10]. The use of generics which is low compared to
other European countries has been increased and addi-
tional savings should come from growing use of ambu-
latory care. In the future, high budget impact drugs will
be covered partially through these saving, partially
though increases in drug budgets and partially through
additional price volume agreements.
England
Recent amendments to the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence (NICE) assessment process were
launched in April 201 [11]. These were agreed with
the National Health Service (NHS) England and include
three key elements. Firstly, a proposal to fast track
access to technologies offering exceptional value for
money (likely cost per extra year of quality-adjusted
life of under £10,000). Secondly, the introduction of a
budget impact test or ‘affordability criteria’ of twenty
million pounds (£20million) per year as an improved
way to manage treatments that are cost-effective, but
have a very high cost. Thirdly, a sliding, but increased,
cost per extra year of quality-adjusted life up to
£300,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY).
For products that are likely to fall over the £20million
threshold, companies will have the opportunity to enter
in confidential negotiations with NHS England, to help
avoid and minimize delays in patients having access to
treatments recommended by NICE [12]. Should this not
be possible and an agreement to minimize the impact
of those drugs cannot be reached, NHS England will be
able to choose to apply to NICE for an extended period
in which to introduce the drug in a phased way. This
will usually be for no more than three years. The phased
implementation would most likely follow the one
undertaken for HCV, where initial access is for patient
groups with the highest clinical benefit or unmet need.
The proposed affordability criteria is a way to
ensure a smooth and affordable access rather than
no access. There is no appetite, both politically or
managerially within the NHS, to significantly amend
the current NICE cost-effective methodology. Previous
efforts to move to a value-based approach were not a
success and given other more pressing priorities for
all parties it is likely that at least for the short term
there will be no significant changes to the current
value-based reimbursement system. But, cost-effec-
tiveness on its own, especially during times of redu-
cing healthcare expenditure or where any increase in
expenditure is less than increase in demand, has been
shown to be insufficient and has been demonstrated
to put a strain on both access to new and innovative
products, not just pharmaceuticals, but also health-
care budgets. The success of the proposed ‘budget
impact threshold’ will be evaluated in the coming
3–5 years and will impact the need for additional
changes in coverage policies.
Italy
The recent Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) algorithm
for the evaluation of novel medicines does not include
affordability [13]. It does not even include cost-effec-
tiveness, to the dismay of several Italian health econo-
mists [13]. As a result, affordability plays no role in
coverage decisions and the power of regions in mana-
ging drug expenses has even been reduced for drugs
with a high level of innovativeness that are now auto-
matically and immediately included on regional
formularies.
Italy relies on three main tools to reduce budget
impact of novel therapies: price negotiations, cap on
specific drug expenditures and performance-based
schemes. While the definition of a ‘cap’ is a quite effec-
tive way to limit budget impact, it is negotiated for
individual products based on expected target popula-
tion and is in fact more a tool to avoid off-label use. Of
interest is the recent evolution in performance-based
schemes. Those were traditionally based on a refund
from the industry to the health system upon failure of
achieving efficacy metrics. However, refunds proved to
be minimal and incomplete [14]. Risk-sharing agree-
ments may now also include a ‘success fees’ (example
pirfenidone for Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis), whereby
the National Health System makes the payment to the
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manufacturer only for patients who received a real
benefit, meaning that payment follows provision of
value [14]. This is perceived by Italian payers as a way
to limit the immediate impact on health budgets and to
be protected from uncertainties on efficacy.
To help afford expensive innovative drugs, Italy has
also created a specific funding mechanism, putting
aside €500million for oncology drugs and another
€500million for non-oncology drugs18. Initially non-
oncology meant only drugs for HCV but other drugs
(e.g. Strimvelis) have been added and will be added in
the future [15]. Should spending reach over €500mil-
lion, for example due to an increase in the number of
patient treated in the indications covered by that spe-
cial fund, the industry will have to pay back the spend-
ing above €500million, leading to a lower net cost per
patient. So this special budget could be in some way
considered as an affordability threshold, but not for
individual drugs, rather by groups of product (highly
innovative oncology and non-oncology).
Finally, negotiation appears to be the strongest tool in
order to achieve affordability, as shown by the Sovaldi
example. Through the combination of price negotiations,
caps and paybacks, the price of Sovaldi has dramatically
diminished from an initial €45,000 ex-factory price to a
real net price of about €15,000 per treatment. The pay-
back from Gilead to AIFA from July 2015 until December
2016 has been of €935million [16]. Unfortunately, this is
only a special case, confirming that there is yet not
transparent and standard mechanism to manage afford-
ability of high budget impact drugs in Italy.
Spain
The approach from the Spanish authorities to afford-
ability has not significantly changed since the 2008
financial crisis when several legislations were passed
forcing an unnegotiated price reduction to some of
the drugs already in the market, plus important com-
pulsory discounts for drugs provided to hospitals [17].
Regions reacted to the latter by shifting some products
to be delivered from hospitals instead of community
pharmacies, and some nursing home supply to be
directly managed from hospital [18].
The Sovaldi case opened the door to budget caps
per drug set at the national level [19]. This has been
implemented for several drugs, but more recently this
option has lost traction in the verge of the difficult
allocation of benefits across the regions. At present,
affordability is still very much transferred to the regions,
and managed through budgetary control. By transfer-
ring budgets to hospitals and limiting their ability to
grow, regions impose priority setting on the hospitals,
which have to be balanced with waiting lists.
The idea of centralised purchasing has been gaining
momentum; the national government has indeed orga-
nised some centralised tenders for some devices [20],
and many regions have initiated centralised purchasing
or at least price negotiation [21]. One clear trend has
been to centralise some regional decision making in the
access to high cost drugs, either by selecting (explicitly
or implicitly) reference centres, or by directly requiring
pre-authorisation of high cost treatments (i.e. oncology)
to a central regional commission.
However, to keep within budgets and ensure sus-
tainability, most of the onus remains on price negotia-
tion at the provider level and some access restrictions
at the regional level. On the price side, there has been a
progressive de-link between the national price level (list
price) and the reimbursed price. Price re-negotiations
have become more and more common at regional and
hospital level, and simple discounts being sought.
Some regions have started imposing flat-fees per dis-
ease (DRG type of payment), whilst annually reducing
the amount in line with expected discounts.
Performance based agreements have been signed as
in many other countries, but to a limited extent, as
many hospitals or institutions have found the transac-
tion costs to high.
Interestingly, the national Government and the
pharma trade representatives keep signing maximum
increases on the level of expenditure, although imple-
mentation of such agreements seem not to take place.
Sweden
When making decisions the Swedish reimbursement
authority (The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits
Agency – TLV) has to follow three principles that are
included in the Health and Medical Service Act: (i) the
human-dignity principle, (ii) the needs-solidarity princi-
ple and (iii) the cost-effectiveness principle [22]. When
making the decisions there is a need to balance those
principles which are often in conflict with each other.
One way to solve the quite obvious conflict between
the principle of needs-solidarity (which means that
more health care resources should be allocated to
patients with greater needs and worse quality of life)
and the principle of cost-effectiveness is through balan-
cing the cost per QALY threshold, allowing higher cost-
effectiveness thresholds (ICER) for treatments of more
severe conditions [23].
The legislation does not mention affordability as
principle, nor is there a debate on affordability thresh-
olds. However, the health care system has to handle
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affordability issues when they appear. The first example
of this, within the current reimbursement system was
the introduction of the new hepatitis-C during 2014.
The problem was that the drugs were found to be
cost-effective but their funding was associated to a
perceived risk of undesired displacement effects in
other areas of the health care system due to very high
budget impact.
After concluding that the health care did not have
the capacity in the short term to treat all patients who
could receive treatment (regardless of severity), TLV
weighed into their decision that priority should be
given to those with the greatest need [24]. TLV decided
to subsidize these drugs with the restriction that they
were only reimbursed for patients in fibrosis stages F3
and F4. For treating patients with lower stages and
therefore with less severe disease, the drugs were not
reimbursed. So in practice TLV used the principle of
need and solidarity to restrict the reimbursement of
new drugs that were potentially not affordable. The
risk and the magnitude of the undesired displacement
effects are however still unknown.
Netherlands
In the Netherlands, there is no maximum affordability
threshold. Budget impact is used to define the need
for detailed assessment [25]: if it is predicted below
EUR 2.5 million on the national level, no extensive
assessment is done. Above that level, the Ministry of
Health stratifies new technologies by low, medium
and high risk innovations due to (i) the height of
the initial budget impact, (ii) the potential increase
of the budget impact in the years after market launch,
(iii) the price of the drug (>EUR 50,000/year is con-
sidered as a red flag) and (iv) the ICER and the meth-
odology of the cost-effectiveness model. The ICER and
the model’s methodology are assessed by
‘Zorginstituut Nederland’. If any of the above aspects
are deemed as ‘high risk’, the pharmaceutical com-
pany is invited by the Ministry of Health to start,
generally on the price, until the budget impact and
ICER are acceptable. There is an informal maximum
cost-effectiveness threshold at EUR 80,000/QALY for
‘end-of-life drugs’). There is no (in)formal affordability
threshold in this later stage of the assessment.
To improve affordability the Dutch health system
relies on traditional tools of price negotiations, define
starting and stopping rules and price/volume agree-
ments. Additionally, the Dutch Health Council may pro-
vide some informal guidance on prescribing in their
advisory reports (this was, for example, the case with
the new oral anti-coagulants and hepatitis C drugs).
More recently joint price negotiations with Belgium,
Luxemburg and Austria have been used to enhance
negotiating power [26]. However, at present, if the
cost effectiveness model is valid and transparent, and
if the ICER threshold is met, a drug cannot formally be
rejected on the basis of affordability or because of its
impact on the prescription budget [25]. There is no
current discussion on establishing an affordability
threshold for budget impact, current political discus-
sions focus on mechanisms to lower drug prices that
are within the realm of the Ministry of Health its power.
For example, a re-definition of the Law on Drugs’ Prices
(‘Wet Geneesmiddel Prijzen’).
Comparison between countries
The analysis of seven European countries shows a great
variability in approaching or handling the affordability
question (Table 1).
There is clearly not one solution that is used consis-
tently across countries but rather a number of ‘tools’
that are combined differently in each country. This
illustrates the difficulty of managing affordability within
different legal frameworks and within different health
care system architectures.
Discussion
While it is clear that novel approaches and mechan-
isms are needed few countries have implemented
formal ‘affordability thresholds’. The only one with a
meaningful formal threshold is actually England even
though caps on volume or price volume agreements















France √√ √ √√
England √√ √√ √√ √√ √ √
Italy √√ √ √√√ √
Spain √√ √ √√ √
Sweden √√√
Netherlands √√√ √ √
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informally play a similar role in several other EU
countries. The question of affordability may become
even more acute if NASH (Nonalcoholic steatohepati-
tis) develops to a multi-billion-dollar indication as
forecasted by the financial industry [27], if Disease
Modifying Therapies for Alzheimer’s Disease reach
market, or when expensive one-off ‘curative’ therapies
enter the market for large indications such as Gene
Therapies for Haemophilia or for hypercholesterole-
mia. As several novel high budget impact therapies
come to market, replicating the budget impact of
hepatitis-C therapies multiple times over, it is likely
that most EU countries will have to increase the use
of approaches to increase affordability. However, we
still do not expect to see a homogeneous pan
European approach, but more a combination of
approaches that will be adapted to each country
health system and to diverse ‘cultural’ attitudes
toward restrictions of therapy coverage.
In these discussions one stakeholder group that so far
has played little impact is politicians, except in England
for cancer therapies. One interesting example comes
from Ireland where a debate has been going on for
several years between The Department of Health and
Health Service Executive (HSE) for funding on novel high
budget impact drug. It started with the funding of
Kalydeco® for Cystic Fibrosis. The drug was initially con-
sidered not cost-effective but following an intensive
lobbying campaign by patients and families, the
Ministry of Health stepped in to ensure funding by HSE
[28]. The debate is now replicated for a group of nine
high-tech drugs for which HSE claims not to have fund-
ing. The Ministry of Health had initially agreed to review
funding requests for high-tech drugs outside of HSE
budget but has now changed its position saying that
such funding should come from savings within HSE [29].
This illustrates the difficulty politicians have with tackling
the question of affordability of new high budget impact
therapies. In most other countries, politicians have been
careful to avoid significant involvement in this question.
For high budget impact therapies, the use of
European price reference is losing relevance. In
England, confidential discounts may be first necessary
to meet NICE cost per QALY requirements, and then
additional confidential discounts may be required to
overcome the £20million affordability threshold. In
France, the price volume agreement leads to net prices
that are widely different from negotiated ‘face’ price.
Similarly, in other countries real net prices per patient
are often far lower than official prices even when those
are negotiated at national level. As a result, many of the
past efforts to ensure price transparency have been
rendered null. This goes against the demands of payers
in most EU countries and will either lead to informal
exchange of confidential information or to higher varia-
bility in price across countries, neither of which is a
desired outcome.
Another important question emerging for payers is the
relationship between affordability and cost-effectiveness.
Not all cost-effective therapies are affordable, as illu-
strated in England by the £20million affordability thresh-
old that also applies to drugs deemed cost-effective by
NICE, and by TLV in Sweden by its decision to limit the
new hepatitis-C drugs to a specific patient population.
NASH is again a good example of the likely payer
dilemma. Health economic models developed by the
industry are likely to support use of the novel therapies.
But savings will be realized in the long-term, often out of
the payer budget cycle and after spending of large sums
of money on the indication for many years. So how can
payers protect themselves against the uncertainty when
long-term clinical benefits and savings turn out to be
lower than expected? Of course, payers will likely become
even more stringent about cost-effectiveness models and
uncertain assumptions to avoid situations such as hepati-
tis-C drugs where long-term data may not confirm initial
analysis. But raising the bar even higher could lead to
denial of coverage of very useful therapies. Italy provides
one interesting alternative: initial low payment to increase
short-term affordability followed by subsequent addi-
tional payment if certain criteria representing value for
patient (not surrogate) are met. But while interesting this
approach may be difficult to implement in countries such
as Germany where patients often change health insur-
ance and may not be attractive to the pharma industry
as it could significantly delay revenues.
Paying for performance is often mentioned as a way
to cope with affordability allowing a faster penetration
of innovations to the market. However, while this can
be an effective tool in some cases, this is not always
true. Paying for performance contracts are regularly
used by the industry during price negotiations to main-
tain or increase official list/reimbursed prices. From a
company point of view this is usually a better approach
than agreeing to a lower official price, especially in
countries that are used internationally for reference
pricing. But the net effect on affordability is often lim-
ited compared to the lower official negotiated price
that would have been required without the pay for
performance contract.
One option that has not gained enough attention is
financial based agreements, by which drugs/new tech-
nologies would be delivered for an agreed fee for a
specific population, irrespective of the actual number of
patients treated. Such an approach has been discussed
for antibiotics and would allow payers to better
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anticipate spending in a given therapeutic area/patient
population, ensuring affordability, or at least leading to
enhanced affordability decisions.
The ‘affordability question’ is also very confusing
for the industry. Revenue modelling for an innovative
high budget impact drug requires specific construct
for each major EU country. Not only effective price
will vary country per country, but so will covered
patient population and not entirely on the basis of
clinical efficacy or cost-effectiveness but to a high
degree simply on the basis of affordability. This is a
criterion that is most difficult to forecast and
depends upon external factors such as overall eco-
nomic situation and potentially launch in completely
unrelated therapeutic areas. While the industry has
been good to forecast the impact of competitive
launch within the same indication, it has little experi-
ence forecasting the impact of the launch of a high
budget impact product in totally unrelated indica-
tions. Pharma companies will need to move from
‘competitive intelligence’ to a broader ‘budget
impact intelligence’ to account for future affordability
issues.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Mathias Flume http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8512-9097
Maarten J. Postma http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6306-3653
References
[1] Access to affordable essential medicines. [cited 2012 Mar
27]. Available from: www.who.int/medicines/mdg/
MDG08ChapterEMedsEn.pdf
[2] Drug prices are voters’ top health policy concern. [cited
2016 Oct 27] .Available from: time.com/money/4548002/
election-2016-drug-prices/
[3] Conti R, Rosenthal M. Pharmaceutical policy reform —
balancing affordability with incentives for innovation. N
Engl J Med. 2016;374(8).
[4] Cure S, Guerra I. Cost-effectiveness and long-term out-
comes of sovaldi (sofosbuvir) for the treatment of
chronic Hepatitis C Infected (HCV) patients from a
Swedish societal Perspective. Value Health. 2014: 17(7):
A675.
[5] Iyengar S, Tay-Teo K, Vogler S et al. Prices, costs, and
affordability of new medicines for Hepatitis C in 30
countries: an economic analysis. PLoS Med. 2016;13(5):
e1002032.
[6] AMNOG - evaluation of new pharmaceutical. [cited 2017
May 03]. Available from: https://www.gkv-spitzenver
band.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/amnog_eva
luation_of_new_pharmaceutical/amnog_english.jsp
[7] Changes to AMNOG. [cited 2017 Mar 10]. Available from
https://mapbiopharma.com/blog/news/news-germany/
2017/changes-to-amnog/
[8] L’évaluation micro-économique des médicaments et dis-




[9] Budget 2018: un effort sans précédents est demandé à




[10] Le déremboursement des médicaments en France entre
2002 et 2011: éléments d’évaluation. [cited 2011 Jul 01].
Available from: www.irdes.fr/Publications/2011/Qes167.pdf
[11] NICE and NHS England consultation on changes to the
arrangements for evaluating and funding drugs and
other health technologies assessed through NICE’s tech-
nology appraisal and highly specialised technologies




[12] Changes to NICE drug appraisals: what you need to
know. [cited 2017 Apr 04]. Available from: https://www.
nice.org.uk/news/feature/changes-to-nice-drug-apprai
sals-what-you-need-to-know
[13] Pros and cons of the new AIFA innovation algorithm: a
critical analysis. [cited 2017 May 04]. Available from:
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pros-cons-new-aifa-inno
vation-algorithm-critical-fabrizio-gianfrate/
[14] Navarria A, Drago V, Gozzo L, et al. Value Health.
2015;18:131–136.
[15] Aggiornamento: elenchi dei farmaci che accedono ai
fondi dei farmaci innovativi istituiti ai sensi della Legge




[16] Epatite C: sovaldi e Harvoni non saranno più rimborsati





[17] Real Decreto-ley 16/2012, de 20 de abril, de medidas
urgentes para garantizar la sostenibilidad del Sistema
Nacional de Salud y mejorar la calidad y seguridad de
sus prestaciones. [cited 2012 Apr 24]. Available at:
https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2012/BOE-A-2012-5403-
consolidado.pdf
[18] Sanidad estudia si es legal que Valencia dé en AP
fármacos preparados en hospital. [cited 2013 Sept 23].
Available from: http://www.farmaindustria.es/idc/groups/
public/documents/noticia/farma_122257.pdf
[19] Los pacientes de hepatitis C serán tratados con los nue-
vos medicamentos de acuerdo con los criterios del Plan
Estratégico. [cited 2015 Feb 26]. Available from: https://
www.msssi.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa.do?id=3576
JOURNAL OF MARKET ACCESS & HEALTH POLICY 7
[20] Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad.
Pliego de prescripciones técnicas del acuerdo marco
para la selección de suministradores de productos sani-
tarios para varias comunidades autónomas y organismos
de la administración general del estado. Madrid. [cited
2017 Feb 12]. https://www.redaccionmedica.com/conte
nido/images/DOCUMENTO_2%281%29.pdf
[21] Acuerdo marco suministro de lancetas de punción y tiras
reactivas de medición de glucosa en sangre capilar, con
destino a las diferentes organizaciones de Osakidetza.











[22] The Health and Medical Services Act, Ministry of Health
and Social Affairs. 1995. Swedish Government proposi-
tion 1996/97:60.
[23] Introduktion till hälsoekonomisk utvärdering. [cited 2017
Feb 12]. Available from: https://www.tlv.se/download/18.
467926b615d084471ac3396b/1510316350460/introduk
tion-halsoekonomi.pdf




[25] Kamerbrief over de voortgang Financiële Arrangementen




[26] The BeNeLuxA initiative aims to ensure sustainable access
to innovative medicine at affordable cost for our patients.
[cited 2017 Sept 06]. Available from: www.beneluxa.org
[27] NASH- the next big global epidemic in 10 years?





[28] New cystic fibrosis drug ivacaftor (Kalydeco) to be made




[29] HSE must fund new high-tech drugs, says department of




8 M. FLUME ET AL.
